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PROTECTING OUR PROTECTORS: WHY TITLE VII
SHOULD APPLY TO THE UNIFORMED MILITARY
FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY

By: Jonathan A. D’Orazio*

ABSTRACT

This Note argues that Title VII should apply to uniformed military members following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v.
Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Foremost, the current intra-military remedies uniformed military members may bring a discrimination claim pursuant fail to effectively combat discrimination
in the United States military due to several critical deficiencies. This
Note demonstrates that the defects within the current intra-military
remedies tacitly permit, rather than discourage, discriminatory conduct.
This Note then examines why the military has historically resisted civilian reform measures to the military justice system. During
this examination, this Note argues that the United States military is
bifurcated between uniformed military members who work within
the military’s increasingly complex military bureaucracy and frontline soldiers exposed to combat. This Note contends that uniformed
military members tasked with operating the military’s bureaucracy
work in an environment more analogous to the civilian workplace.
Accordingly, these military members fall within the purview of civilian reform measures. Regarding combat soldiers, this Note explains that throughout the history of the United States, the military
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has been forced to accept civilian reform measures designed to end
discriminatory practices within the military. Significantly, these policies made no distinction between combat and non-combat soldiers.
This Note then argues why a Title VII claim is the appropriate
remedy to combat discrimination in the United States military before
demonstrating why Title VII should apply to uniformed military
members following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock. Based
on the majority’s decision in Bostock, this Note concludes that the rationales set forth by the United States Courts of Appeals prior to Bostock excluding uniformed military members from Title VII’s remedial
scheme should no longer be followed considering Bostock.
This Note calls on the judiciary to reconsider whether Title VII
should apply to uniformed military members. Members of the
United States military rightfully deserve protection under the very
laws they preserve pursuant to their service and sacrifice.
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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits discrimination
based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” with respect
to the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.2 In 1972,
Congress amended and expanded the protections of Title VII to
reach federal and military employees by mandating “[a]ll personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in military departments as defined in section 102 of title 5” fall under the
statute.3 Courts conclude that “military department,” as defined in
the foregoing statutory provision, includes uniformed military personnel.4 Moreover, the reach of the statute is explicitly broad, as it
applies to “all personnel actions.”5 The plain language of the statute
compels a reading that supports application to the uniformed military in military departments, rather than a narrow construction that
relies on extratextual considerations to exclude the uniformed

*Jonathan D’Orazio is a graduate from the University of WisconsinMadison where he received his BA in Political Science in 2019. Jonathan is currently in this third year of law school at the Washington
and Lee University School of Law. He would like to thank Professor
Mona Houck for her invaluable insight and guidance. This Note
would not have been possible without her. He would also like to
thank his girlfriend, Jordyn Kline, for her endless love and support.
Finally, Jonathan would like to thank his parents; Blanche Greenfield
and Vincent D’Orazio. He would not even be in a position to write a
Note if not for them.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17).
2 Id.
3 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (citation omitted)).
4 See Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding that the term “military departments” referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 contains “both civilian employees and the
armed forces”); Alexander v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978) (“The great ‘military departments’ . . . referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 include not only uniformed personnel
of various ranks and grades but also of thousands of men and women employed in civilian
capacities.”).
5 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)).
1
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military from the reach of Title VII.6 Despite this clear statutory mandate, several United States courts of appeals have concluded that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military.7 But the appellate
courts, in reaching their consensus conclusion, offer conflicting rationales to hold that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military.8 The reasoning employed by these courts is directly at odds
with the method of statutory interpretation employed by the majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County,9 to define the parameters of
the applicability of Title VII.10
This Note argues that the ordinary meaning of the express terms
of Title VII, in accordance with the analysis employed by the Bostock
majority, compels the conclusion that Title VII includes the uniformed military within its framework.11 In the course of reaching this
conclusion, this Note in Parts II and III explores and discusses why

See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (“Judges are not free to
overlook plain statutory commands on the strength of nothing more than suppositions
about intentions or guesswork about expectations.”); Craig Westergard, You Catch More
Flies With Honey: Reevaluating the Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII, 20
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE 215, 234 (2019) (noting that “it would be an abnormal
reading, not an ordinary one, to suggest that phrase ‘military departments’ includes only
the civilian employees of those departments” because “there is nothing in the text of the
statute that suggests such a limitation”).
7 See Modly, 949 F.3d at 763; Johnson, 572 F.2d at 1224; Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d
295, 298 (5th Cir. 2000); Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1997); Roper v. Dep’t
of the Army, 832 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1987); Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.3d 926, 928 (9th
Cir. 1987).
8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (No. 20-19) (writing that the “Court of Appeals’ approaches for determining if Title
VII covers the uniformed military not only are in conflict with one another, but are also
replete with weaknesses identified already in the case law and elsewhere”); Westergard,
supra note 6, at 251 (observing that “tensions between the ordinary meaning of Title VII
and the policy considerations” of extending the statute to the uniformed military have
“produced confusion and inconsistency in the federal courts”).
9 140 S. Ct. at 1749 (2020).
10 See id. at 1737 (“When the express terms of a statute give us on answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law,
and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”); id. at 1738. (“If judges could add to, remodel,
update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our
imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved
for the people’s representatives.”).
11 See id. at 1747 (“[W]hen Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad
rule, courts apply the broad rule. And that is exactly how this Court has always approached Title VII.”); infra Part VII.
6
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remedies currently available to military members to pursue claims
of discrimination are inadequate.12 This Note in Part III will also review the evolving role of the military from a purely combat function
to one that fulfills many roles akin to those found in a civilian workplace. Part IV details why providing uniformed military members
access to a Title VII cause of action furthers the attainment of the beneficial goals of fair and equal treatment, untainted by discrimination
for members of the United States armed forces. Part V reviews and
examines the Supreme Court’s method of interpreting Title VII in
Bostock.13 This Note in Part VI will review the several appellate court
decisions that opine that uniformed personnel are beyond the reach
of Title VII.14 In the course of this review, this Note will explain why
these decisions are in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock and should no longer be followed.15 This Note concludes in Part VII and VIII by proposing that uniformed military
members are included within Title VII following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bostock.
DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
Discrimination has persisted both implicitly and explicitly
throughout the history of the United States military. The military has
adopted discriminatory policies, including the segregation of Black
troops, the prohibition against women serving in combat roles, the
military’s “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” policy affecting LGBTQ+ persons,
and the Trump administration's attempts to ban transgender servicepersons from the military.16 Recent studies show that in the contemporary United States military, discrimination remains a pervasive “undercurrent” that is left unchecked and unaddressed by the

See infra Parts II, III.
See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part VI.
15 Id.
16 Westergard, supra note 6, at 218.
12
13
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current legal remedies presently available to uniformed military
members.17
A 2013 survey conducted by the Pentagon showed that 16 % of
minorities in the military experienced harassment, discrimination or
both because of their race or ethnicity.18 In the 2017 iteration of the
survey, 31.2% of Black servicemembers reported suffering racial discrimination, harassment, or both.19 Moreover, 23.3% of Asian troops
and 21% of Hispanic troops surveyed reported suffering racial discrimination.20 Furthermore, sexual assault within the uniformed military has steadily increased since 2006, according to Department of
Defense (hereinafter “DoD”) reports, including a 15% jump in 2018
and a 3% increase in 2019.21 In a 2018 survey conducted by the DoD,
“nearly one out of every four female service members indicated experiencing behavior consistent with sexual harassment.”22
Significantly, it is possible that these surveys did not capture all
the instances of discrimination that uniformed military members endured or encountered.23 Many uniformed military members have little faith in the reporting mechanisms because of the lack of effective
legal remedies available to the uniformed military to redress discrimination.24 The DoD estimated that “[i]n 2010, reports by victims

17 Lolita C. Baldor, For 1st Black Pentagon Chief, Racism Challenge Is Personal, YAHOO
(Jan. 23, 2021, 12:43 AM), https://www.yahoo.com/news/1st-black-pentagon-chief-racism054307674.html.
18 Phil Stewart et. al., U.S. Troops Battling Racism Report High Barrier to Justice, REUTERS
(Sept. 15, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-military-civilrights/.
19 Phil Stewart, Exclusive: Long-Withheld Pentagon Survey Shows Widespread Racial Discrimination, Harassment, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2021, 8:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-civilrights-exclusive-idUSKBN29J1N1.
20 Id.
21 See Dep't of Def. Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Off., Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 2019 6 (2020).
22 Stewart, supra note 18.
23 See id. (“[I]nterviews with dozens of current and former U.S. service members reveal deep skepticism about whether coming forward with concrete allegations of discrimination will be beneficial.”).
24 See Dep’t of Def. Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Off., Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 2010 41 (2011) [hereinafter “2010 SAPRO Report”] (finding that for those female servicemembers who did report
instances of sexual assault, “most female victims surveyed indicate[d] experiencing some
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accounted for about 14 percent of the sexual assaults estimated to
have occurred . . . The majority of sexual assaults against Service
members each year remain unreported.”25 As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed, “[S]ervicemen and servicewomen who experience inservice sexual assaults face ‘unique’
disincentives to report.”26 Without a Title VII remedy, the inadequacy of the existing legal remedies has resulted in a military justice
system which “helps mask the full extent of racial discrimination in
the armed forces” rather than effectively combatting and eliminating
discriminatory conduct.27
The DoD acknowledges that discrimination “is contrary to good
order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness
and mission accomplishment” yet has failed to provide uniformed
military members the protections of Title VII.28 As U.S. Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand stated, the DoD leadership pays “lip service to
equality,” while tacitly fostering an environment in which “minority
service members face rampant discrimination and harassment, and
those that report it are nearly as likely to face punishment as the perpetrators.”29 If the military justice system is not reformed to adequately redress discrimination, the good order and discipline within
the ranks of the United States armed forces will ultimately suffer. 30

kind of retaliation (either professional or social) or administrative action against them associated with their reporting the sexual assault”).
25 Id. at 22.
26 See AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“There are barriers to reporting incidents of sexual assault. Some are consistent with those in the civilian community while others are unique in a military setting.” (quoting DOD CARE FOR VICTIMS OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE, REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, 28
(2004))).
27 Stewart, supra note 18; see DEP’T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE OFF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2012 18 (2012) (hereinafter “2012 SAPRO REPORT”) (concluding
that “[o]ver the past 6 years, the [DoD] estimates that fewer than 15 percent of sexual assault victims report[ed] the matter to a military authority”).
28 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 1350.2: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY (MEO) PROGRAM (2015).
29 Anagha Srikanth, Pentagon Report Reveals Widespread Racial Discrimination, Harassment, THE HILL (Jan. 22, 2021), https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/equality/535477-pentagon-report-reveals-widespread-racial-discrimination.
30 See Marcy C. Griffin, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2109 (1987) (“As General Douglas MacAthur

2021]

PROTECTING OUR PROTECTORS

17

LEGAL REMEDIES FOR DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS PRESENTLY
AVAILABLE TO THE UNIFORMED MILITARY
Currently, uniformed military personnel may pursue remedies
for discrimination either through the general grievance procedure of
Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”)31 or under the DoD Military Equal Opportunity (“MEO”) Program.32 However, both the UCMJ and the MEO Program suffer from critical defects that render these options ineffectual in adequately redressing
discrimination in the military.33
Discretion in the UCMJ
Following World War II, Congress passed the UCMJ in response
to “widespread perceptions of fundamental unfairness” in the military’s court-martial system, in large part caused by the presence of
“unlawful command influence.”34 Although the UCMJ did address
some of the unfair aspects of the military justice system, it failed to
remove the potential for military commanders to exert undue influence and even a lack of impartiality regarding claims brought by uniformed military members.35

once pointed out, morale within the military ‘will quickly wither and die if soldiers come
to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude on the part of their military leaders.’” (quoting Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1933, quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 771 (15th ed. 1982))).
31 UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST., 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–940.
32 DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 28.
33 See Griffin, supra note 30, at 2086 (providing a non-exhaustive list of the principal
deficiencies
in
the
current
intramilitary
remedies,
including:
“(1) control by the chain of command; (2) lack of formal procedures, accountability, or
hearings; and (3) inappropriateness of military fora as courts of last resort”).
34 Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U.
DET. C.L. 57, 58 (2002).
35 See John S. Cooke, The Twenty-Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Manual for
Courts-Martial 20X, 156 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (observing that the UCMJ “preserved . . . a
still very substantial role for commanders, in order to ensure that it would remain responsive to the special needs and exigencies of the military” (citation omitted)); Lindsy Nicole
Alleman, Who is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The Disciplinary Role of the Commander in
Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 167, 171-72 (2006) (“The general
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Under either the UCMJ or MEO paradigms, a uniformed military
member can only bring a claim of discrimination through the chain
of command.36 Within these two programs, a military commander is
afforded vast discretion in how to proceed when presented with such
claims brought by subordinate uniformed military members.37 A
military commander can direct preliminary investigations into potential misconduct, evaluate the results of the investigation, dispose
of cases, bring criminal charges, select a jury to hear those cases when
charges are brought, and make the final decision to enforce the trial’s
results.38 Such discretion, however, is also fertile ground for

concern regarding unlawful command influence is that the commander has the ability to
influence judicial proceedings and participants in such a way as to deprive the accused of
his right to a fair trial.”).
36 See Griffin, supra note 30, at 2087 n.34 (“DoD regulations provide that ‘[t]he chain
of command is the primary channel to correct discriminatory practices and for communication of race relations and equal opportunity matters.’” (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 191.4(g)
(1986)). Article 138 of the UCMJ similarly provides that:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by
his commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior
commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against
whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for
redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible,
send to the Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint,
with the proceedings had thereon. 10 U.S.C. § 938.
37 See James B. Boan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New
Millennium, 52 A.F.R. L. REV. 185, 190 (2002) (“Central to the military justice system is a
commander’s authority and discretion to control discipline within his or her unit.”); Alleman, supra note 35, at 171 (“The U.S. commander plays a dominant role in all aspects of
the disciplinary system and ‘has near absolute discretion at every stage of a military justice
proceeding.’” (quoting Meredith L. Robinson, Volunteers for the Death Penalty? The Application of Solorio v. United States to Military Capital Litigation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1049, 1061
(1998)).
38 See Dan E. Stigall, An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) Over Civilians and the Implication of International Human Rights
Law, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L COMPL. L. 59, 62 (2009) (providing a comprehensive description
of a military commander’s authority under the military legal regime); Alleman, supra note
35, at 171 (listing a commanding officer’s various powers including the ability to “conduct
direct investigations,” refer and convene charges to court-martial, and “select court-martial panel members”).
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commanders to potentially abuse their authority which is the “mortal enemy of military justice.”39
It is perhaps the commanding officer’s ability to select the jury
members in a court-martial proceeding that constitutes the greatest
threat to a uniformed military member’s constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury.40 Inseparable from granting the commanding officer the ability to select jury members is the risk that a commander
may stack the jury against a uniformed military member.41 The military justice system thereby presents the potential problem of a commander using his power to undermine the fairness of disciplinary
proceedings.42 Ultimately, this threat can, and likely already does,
deter uniformed military members from bringing claims of discrimination because they have lost faith in the ability of the military justice system to protect their individual rights.43
A central issue with granting commanding officers such authority is that a conflict of interest will invariably arise when claims of
discrimination are aired in a commanding officer’s unit. The conflict
of interest surfaces because these claims could adversely impact a
commanding officer’s promotional opportunities.44 Thus, a commanding officer may forego an impartial investigation of an

United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).
See United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 252 (C.M.A. 1988) (Cox, J., concurring) (writing that a commanding officers role selecting members for court “is the most vulnerable
aspect of the court-martial system”).
41 Colonel Jeremy S. Weber, Court-Martial Nullification: Why Military Justice Needs a
“Conscience of the Commander,” 80 THE A.F.L. REV. 1, 41 (2019) (noting that the military justice system’s method of selecting jurors “opens the possibility that—intentionally or not—
the convening authority may ‘stack the court’”).
42 See Alleman, supra note 35, at 171 (noting that the military justice system presents
the problem of a commanding officer using his or her power and influence to “thwart the
fairness, impartiality, and integrity of disciplinary proceedings”).
43 See Stewart, supra note 19 (“A Reuters investigation this year found servicemembers are far less likely than civilian Defense Department employees to bring forward their
concerns about discrimination through formal channels.”).
44 See Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251, 290 (2009) (observing that a “commander may be motivated to forego punishment not for the sake of some larger national goal, but instead for
the sake of personal ambition and, in particular, a fear that his subordinates’ offense will
taint his future professional prospects”).
39
40

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

20

[Vol. 23.1

otherwise viable claim to protect the officer’s promotion potential.45
A 2011 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office confirmed that some commanding officers were “reluctant to forward
complaints of sexual harassment outside their command out of fear
that those complaints may reflect badly on their leadership or hurt
their chances of promotion.”46 Moreover, commanding officers may
retaliate against a uniformed military member who pursues such
claims through attacks on their credibility, docking pay, suspension,
or demotion.47 In fact, a 2010 DoD report indicated that more than
half of the female service members who experienced, but did not report, an incident of unwanted sexual contact “cite[d] fear of retaliation or reprisals . . . as a reason for not reporting.”48 Significantly, it
is these very commanding officers who control a uniformed military
members promotional opportunities within the military. As U.S.
Congressperson Jackie Speier of California, who leads the Military
Personnel Panel on the House Armed Services Committee, stated,

See Kathryn Sobotta, Command Authority, Undue Command Influence and the Role of
the Staff Judge Advocate, 31 GEO. LEGAL ETHICS 847, 852 (2018) (writing that a “perception
exists among military leaders that . . . multiple issues within a unit such as crime, suicide,
or training accidents may be career-ending”). As Captain Deshauna Barber, a Black officer
in the Army Reserve and activist on behalf of women service members, articulated, the
only way to resolve this inherent conflict of interest “is to completely remove the reporting
system from the chain of command.” Stewart, supra note 18.
46 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-809, PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
DOD NEEDS GREAT LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT AND AN OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK 10 (2011).
47 See Ann-Marie Woods, A “More Searching Judicial Inquiry”: The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C.L. Rev. 1329, 1350 (2014) (“Commanding officers
often choose to deflect blame by attacking the credibility of the victims and their allegations rather than fairly and impartially investigating and permitting viable claims to proceed through the military justice system.”); Westergard, supra note 6, at 230 (stating that
uniformed military members have no incentive to report commanding officers who can
then retaliate against them by “demoting them, suspending them, or docking their pay”).
48 2010 SAPRO REPORT, supra note 24, at 95; see DOD, CALENDAR YEAR 2004 REPORT:
SEXUAL OFFENSES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 5 (2005) (“A victim's fear of
punishment [for misconduct occurring at the same time as the assault] is a significant barrier to reporting sexual assault.”); AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Id.
at 1322 (“Fourth, there is a unique deterrent to reporting inservice sexual assaults to military authorities that is not usually present in criminal cases: that is the fear of reprisals. A
servicemember who is raped by another servicemember, and reports that rape within the
chain of command, is making the report to a person professionally (and perhaps personally) associated with the rapist. Thus, many servicemembers fear that the act of reporting
a rape to military authorities will subject them to personal and professional reprisals.”)
45
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“[T]here is a career downside risk to coming forward and rocking the
boat.”49 Thus, the military has created an environment in which the
price of promotion compels silence in the face of discrimination.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
former United States Marine Ben Klay addressed this glaring conflict
and the cover-up scenarios which it spawns, stating,
The result of this conflict of interest experienced by those
who oversee and staff the military justice system are tendencies to cover-up crimes that could reflect poorly on the leadership, and retaliate against those who would allege such
crimes. Cover-up is often far less risky than exposing an ugly
truth, and retaliation serves the purposes of scaring people
away from making serious allegations, and destroying the
credibility of those who do make them.50
Further supporting Klay’s testimony, a 2020 Reuters investigation found that “servicemembers are far less likely than civilian Defense Department employees to bring forward their concerns about
discrimination through formal channels.”51 Servicemembers explained that their reticence to use the current legal remedies is due
to the fact that the remedies are “often a dead end, resulting in little
action, or worse, backfiring on the complainant.”52
Beyond retaliation, uniformed military members are further disincentivized from bringing a claim of discrimination because “service members are not entitled to damages or attorney’s fees if they

49 Stewart, supra note 18. Furthermore, Vincent Stewart, a retired Marine three star
general, stated that “[I]f you want to progress, you don’t make a whole lot of waves, do
you? There’s no great incentive to come forward.” Id.
50 Statement of Ben Klay, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Ben
Klay of Invisible War, PROTECT OUR DEFS. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.protectourdefenders.com/testimony-before-the-senate-armed-services-committee-by-ben-klay-of-invisiblewar/.
51 Stewart, supra note 19.
52 Id.; see GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-1013T, MILITARY PERSONNEL:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOD'S AND THE COAST GUARD'S SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAMS 14 (2008) (finding that “[c]ommonly cited reasons
[for not reporting] at the installations we visited included: (1) the belief that nothing would
be done; (2) fear of ostracism harassment, or ridicule by peers; and (3) the belief that their
peers would gossip about the incident”).
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are successful.”53 Thus, the current remedies provided under the military justice system, far from vindicating the rights of service members to be free of discrimination, have in reality contributed to the
existence of a chilling effect on the ability of uniformed military personnel to seek meaningful recourse for claims of discrimination.54
Colonel Don Christensen, a former Chief Prosecutor for the United
States Air Force, commented on this chilling effect in observing that
under the current military justice system, uniformed military members have little “incentive to use the process because it rarely works,
and they rarely rule in their favor.”55
The Punitive Focus of the Military Justice System
While the civil law system aims to protect the rights of individuals,56 the military justice system is instead focused on the goal of assessing punishment in the name of maintaining good order and discipline within the military.57 Thus, the military’s punishment centric
system is ill-equipped to handle statutorily created or constitutionally based claims involving discrimination because it deprives uniformed military members of rights they would otherwise have in
civil courts.58

53 Brief of Protect Our Defs. & Black Veterans Project as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 28, Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (2020) (No. 20-19), 2020 WL 4819829 at *28
[hereinafter Brief in Support of Petitioner].
54 See Woods, supra note 47, at 1351 (“Due to the risk of retaliation and further abuse
after reporting the crime, victims experience pressure to refrain from reporting, altogether.”).
55 Stewart, supra note 18.
56 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969) (“A civilian trial, in other words,
is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military
trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice.”).
57 See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., 116TH CONG., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES I-1 (Comm. Print 2019) (identifying “the purpose of the military justice system is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed
forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby
to strengthen the national security of the United States”); Michael I. Spak & Alice M.
McCart, Effect of Military Culture on Responding to Sexual Harassment: The Warrior Mystique,
83 NEB. L. REV. 79, 85 n.22 (2004) (stating that “little doubt exists” that the military justice
system is an “instrument of discipline, not a system of justice”).
58 See United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (observing that
court-martial panels “have not been and probably never can be constituted in such a way
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Courts have historically justified the limitations inherent in the
military justice system as a “necessity.”59 The “necessity” rationale
posits that an indispensable element to the functioning of the military are service members who are steeped in obedience and discipline to the command structure.60 The rationale then asserts that obedience and discipline would be undermined if uniformed military
members are granted the additional statutory and constitutional protections afforded by civil courts.61 Historically, the judiciary has been
highly deferential to the decisions of the military justice system.62 As
explained by former Chief Justice Earl Warren “[C]ourts are
ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.”63 However, the
“necessity” rationale has become highly attenuated as the majority

that they can have the same qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to
fair trials of civilians in federal courts”); Griffin, supra note 30, at 2105 (stating forcefully
that the “military possesses neither the competence nor the jurisdiction to assess statutory
or constitutional claims of discrimination”).
59 See Westergard, supra note 6, at 247 (describing that the main justification “courts
give for prohibiting servicepersons from seeking remedies under Title VII is that it will
negatively affect military discipline, and that discipline is necessary to maintain national
security”).
60 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983)
[C]onduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that precede combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in
its application to the military establishment and wholly different from
civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long
before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship been enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily
unique structure of the Military Establishment.
61 See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the
Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CAL. L. REV. 165, 192 (2000) (explaining that “it is argued
that if courts permit service members to bring civil actions to enforce individual liberties
contrary to a superior officer’s orders military discipline could become seriously disrupted”); id. (“Making civilian judges the final arbiter of such claims would destroy the
essential image of unquestioned military authority.”).
62 See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.”); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (noting that “[t]his Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society”).
63 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962).
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of uniformed military members are no longer in a combat role.64 Instead, these uniformed military members are tasked with operating
the military’s increasingly complex bureaucracy that is more analogous to the civilian workplace.65
The Modern-Day Military Has Expanded Beyond Core Combat
Functions and Includes Collateral Areas of Governance
The United States military is “now composed of more citizens
than some states” and “performs a broad array of tasks removed
from its core combat-related functions.”66 The military today employs a vast bureaucracy of service personnel whose essential functions include overseeing and operating an “expanding criminal justice system, a medical care system, and an educational system.”67 The
strength of the “necessity” rationale has receded because uniformed
service personnel are utilized as employees in roles other than exclusively combat roles.68 The reality is that in the modern day military,
[t]he great bulk of servicemen . . . do clerical, maintenance,
and service jobs that never expose them to combat positions.
The duties of a military computer programmer, truck mechanic, or cook are not intrinsically different from his or her
civilian counterpart . . . and the full rigors of traditional

64 See Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 133 (2002)
(“While military service requires both sacrifice and subordination, the nexus between the
demands of military governance and martial necessity has become highly extenuated.”);
James B. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen’s Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 204 (1984) (arguing that the “actual separateness of the
traditional military community has ceased to exist”).
65 Turley, supra note 64, at 133; Hirschhorn, supra note 64, at 204.
66 Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Loss of Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 689 (2002); see Courtney W. Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 93, 107 (1985)
(“Third, the military transformed into a huge civilian-like bureaucracy.”).
67 Turley, supra note 64, at 8.
68 See id. at 50 (recognizing that while depriving soldiers of certain constitutional
rights is “plausible in the narrow context of combat operations and support, this conclusory position ignores the realities of modern military governance, particularly in collateral
areas of military governance”); id. (explaining that the essential function of the job performed by many members of the uniformed military are unrelated to the combat readiness
justification because “[n]ot all of these areas are materially related to combat readiness,
particularly during periods of peacetime”).
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military discipline are no more needed in these jobs than
they would be in a civilian corporation.69
For uniformed military members who function in such non-combat roles, the military obedience and discipline rationale is inapposite.70 It is illogical to preclude uniformed military members from
bringing a Title VII claim under the “necessity” rationale, when most
military function in settings more similar to those found in the civilian workplace.71
Civilian Authorities Have Historically Implemented Reform
Measures to End Discriminatory Practices in the Military Without
Damaging “Good Order and Discipline”
Even uniformed military members who perform combat-related
functions should be afforded the right to bring a Title VII cause of
action.72 The notion that the military is immune from civilian reform
efforts is founded on the justification that questions implicating military order and discipline should be answered solely by the military

Hirschhorn, supra note 64, at 205 (citation omitted); see Griffin, supra note 30, at 2098
(noting that “the great majority of servicepersons perform technical, clerical, and other
tasks similar to those of civilian employees”).
70 See Turley, supra note 64, at 31 n.23 (writing that the military’s obedience justification becomes attenuated when applied to uniformed service members working in collateral areas of governance because “their connection to the combat role of the military is at
best indirect and supplementary”); Howland, supra note 66, at 108 (observing that as the
military bureaucracy continues to grow, “[t]he corresponding percentage of forces engaged in traditional military duties has rapidly declined”).
71 See Hirschhorn, supra note 64, at 205–06 (“If the business of the armed forces is to
fight wars, it follows that only those personnel who do so should be set apart from the
larger society.”); Turley, supra note at 64 (“Rather than attempting to maintain a total society and government, . . . the military would be better served by reducing the scope of governance to core military functions.” (citation omitted)).
72 See Kelly E. Henriksen, Gays, the Military, and Judicial Deference: When the Courts
Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area of Expertise, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1273, 1279
(writing that the military has historically developed “its own practices, laws and traditions
in preparation for its ultimate responsibility” of waging war); Captain John A. Carr, Free
Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. 303, 307–08 (1998) (noting that judiciary has been deferential to the military’s resistance to changes and/or reforms it considers disruptive “based upon the unique
military mission, the critical importance of obedience and subordination, and the complimentary development of military custom”).
69
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hierarchy.73 Throughout the history of the United States, however,
civilian authorities have implemented reforms that have significantly altered the day-to-day operations of the military. U.S. Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand articulated this reality when she stated that,
“When we wanted women to be able to serve in the military . . . [and]
[w]hen we integrated the armed services, commanders said you cannot possibly do this; it will undermine good order and discipline. We
did it.”74 As Professor Francine Banner noted, civilian reform was
needed to reverse the nearly twenty-year campaign from the 1990s
to the 2010s during which “the military carried out overtly discriminatory practices without sanction under the guise that purposeful
discrimination against gay and lesbian personnel, and particularly
lesbian personnel, promoted unit cohesion and combat readiness.”75
The military has historically resisted and/or been reluctant to adopt
major reform measures.76 But history also shows that despite forecasts of doom and disaster from the implementation of such
measures, the military has survived intact and no less formidable.77
To the contrary, the imposition of civilian norms on the military has
increased the military’s effectiveness by eliminating discrimination
experienced by uniformed military members.78

See Jeffrey A. Critchlow, Propping the Courthouse Door: Why Service Members Should
Be Able to Bring Sexual Harassment Suits Under the Feres Doctrine, 104 IOWA L. REV. 855, 873
(2019) (explaining the military fears that “allowing service members to sue the military
will cause commanders to be more timid in their actions for fear they will be sued” and
that “commanders need to focus on training their troops for operational readiness instead
of focusing on tort liability”).
74 159 CONG. REC. 17, 119 (2013) (statement of Sen. Gillibrand).
75 Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: Judicial Review of Intra-Military Sexual Assault
Claim, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 723, 785 (2013).
76 See Critchlow, supra note 73, at 873 (noting that the military has always raised concerns pertaining to order and discipline in the face of a reform measure, “[Y]et with each
reform that occurs, the military has repeatedly acknowledged that these concerns are unfounded”).
77 Id.
78 See Hirschhorn, supra note 64, at 206–07 (arguing forcefully that the “judicial imposition of civilian norms on the armed forces would increase military effectiveness”).
73
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The Modern-Day Judiciary Routinely Renders Judgements on
Complex Matters in Which They Are Not Experts
Historically, the judiciary has been highly deferential to cases
that implicate the good order and discipline of the military.79 But
such deference is now the subject of reexamination. As Professor Jonathan Turley explains, the “judicial incompetence rationale is hardly
compelling in an age of regulation in which courts routinely deal
with the most complex and comprehensive issues involving federal
agencies.”80 Furthermore, as Professor Turley notes, the idea that the
judiciary should defer to military judgement because of the specialized nature of the military community is weakened in light of the fact
that courts “often review actions taken by agencies like the DOE and
NASA despite their classified functions and specialized communities.”81 Arguably, even if a claim implicates issues concerning the
good order and discipline in the armed forces, the military could provide expert testimony regarding the impact of the ruling or relief
sought. Educating a judge or jury on a complex matter through expert testimony is a routine feature of the civil justice system, as “experts do on other complicated subjects . . . such as civil and criminal
Medicare fraud cases brought under the antikickback statute, antitrust actions, patent infringement cases, and others in which the triers of fact know little about the technical aspects of the matter.”82 The
judiciary’s ability to deal with the complex and comprehensive issues involving federal agencies should instill confidence in its competence to entertain a Title VII claim brought by a uniformed military
member.83

79 See Warren, supra note 63, at 187 (writing that “courts are ill-equipped to determine
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have”).
80 Turley, supra note 66, at 700.
81 Id.
82 Spak & McCart, supra note 5757, at 110–11 (2004) (citation omitted).
83 See Griffin, supra note 30, at 2104 (stating that the judiciary has not “demonstrated
any less competence in considering individual rights than in prison, government employment, or national security contexts-other settings involving considerations of discipline or
other complex and sensitive matters”).
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TITLE VII AND UNIFORMED MILITARY MEMBERS
The purpose of a Title VII claim is to pursue fairness and equal
treatment in the employment context. A uniformed military member
who brings a Title VII claim seeks only to serve their country in a fair
environment free from discrimination.84 As described below, access
to a Title VII cause of action in the civil court system will allow uniformed military members to serve without fear of being discriminated against.85
Foremost, unlike the military justice system,86 the civil court system aims to protect individual rights.87 Thus, the civil court system
is the more appropriate venue to redress discrimination claims and
vindicate individual rights in the employment context.88 It is illogical
to relegate military members to a military justice regime that is tone
deaf to such claims based on outdated rationales. Access to Title VII’s
detailed remedial scheme furthers the attainment of the beneficial
goals of fair and equal treatment, untainted by discrimination for
members of the United States armed forces.89
Importantly, this remedial scheme includes compensatory as
well as punitive damages for victims of discrimination.90 Title VII’s
scheme is distinct from the military justice system, under which “service members are not entitled to damages or attorneys’ fees if they

84 See Westergard, supra note 6, at 249 (“Just because a serviceperson has been discriminated against, or has initiated a claim, does not mean that serviceperson is then free
to disobey orders—either while the claim is pending or after it has been adjudicated.”).
85 See id. (arguing that providing uniformed military members with a Title VII cause
of action would likely diminish incidents of discrimination over time, “and any negative
effects on discipline would diminish with them”).
86 See Griffin, supra note 30, at 2088 (“The cardinal goal of military law and military
tribunals is discipline, not justice.”).
87 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969) (“A civilian trial, in other words,
is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military
trial is marked by the age-manifest destiny of retributive justice.”).
88 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969) (“A civilian trial, in other words,
is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military
trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice.”).
89 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366 (2011) (“Title VII includes a
detailed remedial scheme.”).
90 See 29 CFR § 1614.501 (1999) (authorizing compensatory and punitive damages and
attorney’s fees and costs for victims of discrimination).
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are successful.”91 Thus, the military justice system provides no incentive for uniformed military members to bring a claim of discrimination, particularly against commanding officer, who may then retaliate against them.92 By contrast Title VII, by providing damages and
barring retaliation,93 incentivizes uniformed military members “to
seek the justice to which they are entitled and to attract competent
counsel to help them in so doing.”94 As a practical matter, it is essential that uniformed military members have the incentive to pursue
discrimination claims and that meaningful redress is available.95
Moreover, a Title VII remedy would cure the potential for the
abuse of power that looms large over the military justice system because of the nearly complete authority vested in commanding officers to handle, investigate, and adjudicate claims of discrimination.96
The independence of investigating officers under the Title VII remedial scheme “would afford complainants more vigorous and unbiased investigation than they receive at present” under the military
justice system.”97 Furthermore, a Title VII remedy would remove the
commanding officer from the jury selection process by implementing
the jury selection process used by the civil court system. Significantly, removing the commanding officer from the jury selection process strengthens the uniformed military member’s constitutional
right to an impartial jury and a fair trial.98

91 Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 53, at 28; see Westergard, supra note 6, at
231 (“Most importantly, neither program awards damages to servicepersons who suffer
from unlawful discrimination.”).
92 See Westergard, supra note 6, at 231 (arguing that by not providing damages, the
military justice system created an environment under which “servicepersons have almost
no incentive to report discrimination—particularly discrimination that is effectuated by
their commanding officer”).
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (barring retaliation within Title VII’s remedial scheme).
94 Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 53, at 30.
95 Id. at 29-30.
96 See Rogers, supra note 61, at 190 (“Under this procedure, EEO counselors and officers outside of an individual’s chain of command would investigate and reconcile discrimination claims.”).
97 Griffin, supra note 30, at 2106.
98 See Smith III, supra note 41, at 687 (noting that by allocating the power to select
jurors in the commanding officer, the military justice system creates the potential for a
commanding officer to “stack the court” against a uniformed military member with partial
jurors); David A. Schlueter, Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act

30

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23.1

Finally, the Title VII remedial scheme contains extensive procedural requirements to assess the merit of claims that are advanced.99
These procedural requirements are designed to prevent the civil
court system from being overwhelmed by non-meritorious claims.
And, as is true for the civil justice system, the military would also
benefit from a system which screens and rejects frivolous claims.100
Before a uniformed military member can file suit in court, he or she
must,
[A]ttempt conciliation through an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor; file a formal
written complaint with the agency; review the disposition proposed after an investigation by the agency
EEO Director; request a formal hearing by a complaint’s examiner or a review by the agency head;
and receive a final agency decision. At each stage,
plaintiff must comply with strict deadlines or waiting periods.101
These procedures strike a careful balance in allowing the military
to first resolve a claim of discrimination, and if the military fails to
do so, then providing for civilian oversight to adjudicate the Title VII
action.102 It is important to note that these procedures have successfully kept the civil court system from being overwhelmed by Title
VII claims brought by employees of paramilitary organizations such

of 2016, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 35–36 (“One of the most controversial aspects of military justice has been the role of commanders in selecting and appoint the court members.”).
99 See Griffin, supra note 30, at 2105 (“In drafting the provisions of Title VII, Congress
provided procedural hurdles for plaintiffs and remedial discretion for courts to avoid disrupting institutions or flooding the courts.”).
100 See id. at 2106 (“The rigorous exhaustion requirements will protect the military
from frivolous suits while the independence of the EEO officers would afford complainants more vigorous and unbiased investigation than they receive at present.”).
101 Id. at 2105–06 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614).
102 See Rogers, supra note 6161, at 190 (explaining that a Title VII cause of action includes “[v]erifiable standards and procedures . . . to be exhausted before resorting to civilian courts” (citation omitted)).
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as fire and police departments, and hospitals, which function largely
by requiring command order and discipline.103
THE SUPREME COURT IN BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY
Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton
County104 determined that Title VII includes within its coverage employees alleging claims of discrimination based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.105 The Bostock Court interpreted the
terms of Title VII in accordance “with the ordinary public meaning
of its terms at the time of its enactment.”106 The Court rejected the use
of “extratextual sources" in interpreting Title VII, because such consideration would result in opinions that “would deny the people the
right to continue relying on the original meaning of the law they have
counted on to settle their rights and obligations.”107 The cautionary
note sounded by Bostock against the use of extratextual considerations is that the role of Congress as the legislative branch is usurped
and replaced by the judiciary.108 The net result of such an exercise is
the denial of rights to individuals and groups by failing to give purpose to the plain language in Title VII.109
To determine the meaning of the express terms of Title VII, the
Supreme Court turned to the dictionary definitions of each word in
the statute to see how a layperson would have understood these
words, at the time of the statute’s enactment.110 Moreover, the Court
rejected the theory that “Congress’s failure to speak directly to a

103 See Griffin, supra note 30, at 30 (“Application of Title VII has not wrought havoc
upon police or fire departments, hospitals, or other institutions that demand discipline
from their employees.”).
104 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
105 Id. at 1737.
106 Id. at 1738.
107 Id.
108 See id. (“If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old statutory
terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives.”).
109 See id. at 1737 (writing that the express terms of a statute must always be applied
over extratextual considerations “when the express terms of a statute give us one answer
and extratextual considerations suggest another”).
110 See id. at 1740 (using Webster’s Dictionary to ascertain the meaning of Title VII’s
express terms at the time Congress enacted the statute).
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specific case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a
tacit exception.”111 Thus, unless Congress specifically speaks to an
individual or class wide exclusion from Title VII, a court must interpret Title VII broadly to include individuals within the scope of the
statute.112
Applying Title VII broadly, in the absence of an explicit congressional exception, the Supreme Court disavowed the use of both the
congressional ratification doctrine and post-enactment legislative
history as tools of statutory interpretation to produce judicially
crafted exclusions to Title VII.113 The congressional ratification doctrine sets forth that “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”114 The
congressional ratification doctrine is inextricably linked with post
enactment legislative history. The congressional ratification doctrine
creates a presumption against an expansive interpretation of a statute when Congress “amend[s]” a statute yet makes the “considered
judgement to retain the relevant statutory text”115 in the face of
“unanimous [circuit] precedent.” 116 The retention of the statutory
text is deemed significant because it is an indication of “convincing
support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified” the
Court of Appeal’s interpretation of that language.117
The Supreme Court in Bostock rejected the use of post enactment
legislative history, and in effect, the congressional ratification doctrine.118 The Court dismissed the use of post enactment legislative

Id. at 1747.
See id. (“Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad
rule, courts apply the broad rule.”).
113 See id. (“All we can know for certain is that speculation about why a later Congress
declined to adopt new legislation offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest
an interpretation of an existing law a different and earlier Congress did adopt.”).
114 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
115 Texas Dep’t of House & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519,
536 (2015).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747 (“There’s no authoritative evidence explaining why
later Congresses adopted other laws referencing sexual orientation but didn’t amend this
one.”); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Arguments
111
112
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history because a court can only speculate as to why Congress, a
multi-member body comprised of individuals with varying constituencies and agendas, would choose to adopt later laws addressing a
current issue rather than amend existing statutes that cover the
area.119 Neither post enactment legislative history, nor the congressional ratification doctrine, provide a sound basis to conclude that
the uniformed military is excluded from the reach of Title VII.120
Finally, the Supreme Court accepted the plain meaning of the
terms of Title VII regardless of whether such an approach would produce future undesirable policy implications.121 In Bostock, it was argued that an example of undesirable policy implications that would
result from a plain reading of the statute were concerns by employers
that “sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes”
would be unsustainable under Title VII.122 Irrespective of any future
policy implications, the Court explained that, “When it comes to statutory interpretation, our role is limited to applying the law’s demands as faithfully as we can in the cases that come before us.”123
This principle of statutory construction makes it abundantly clear

based on subsequent legislative history . . . should not be taken seriously, not even in a
footnote.”).
119 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747 (rejecting the use of post enactment legislative history); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (arguing that legislative intent is an internally
inconsistent statement because while “[i]ndividuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not”).
120 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 343–44 (7th Cir. 2017)
Legislative history, however, is notoriously malleable. Even worse is
the temptation to try to divine the significance of unsuccessful legislative efforts to change the law. Those failures can mean almost anything, ranging from the lack of necessity for a proposed change because the law already accomplishes the desired goal, to the
undesirability of the change because a majority of the legislature is
happy with the way the courts are currently interpreting the law, to
the irrelevance of the non-enactment, when it is attributable to nothing more than legislative logrolling or gridlock that had nothing to do
with its merits.
121 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (stating forcefully that it is the duty of a court to apply
a statute’s plain language even if “any number of undesirable policy consequences would
follow”).
122 Id.
123 Id.
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that the express terms of Title VII in applying to uniformed members
of the military can no longer be ignored or dismissed based on considerations not found in the text of Title VII itself.124 Thus, it is not the
role of the judiciary to decline giving force and effect to the plain language of Title VII. If Congress determines that if finds that unacceptable policy implications result from a court decision, it can act to
undo such outcomes.125 The plain language of Title VII supports the
conclusion that the uniformed military should be included within
the statue’s purview, irrespective of any potential negative policy implications which may follow.126
THE BOSTOCK STANDARD EXTENDS TITLE VII TO THE UNIFORMED
MILITARY
Currently, appellate courts have anchored their decisions to preclude active--duty service members from pursuing Title VII claims
by resorting to extratextual considerations. This approach by these
courts is directly at odds with the method of statutory interpretation
employed by the majority opinion in Bostock in defining the reach of
Title VII.127 This Note examines each of these decisions in turn.
Bostock Directs Courts to Follow the Explicit Command Contained
in Title VII and Ignore Post Enactment Legislative History
The D.C. Circuit in Jackson v. Modly128 based its decision to exclude the uniformed military from the reach of Title VII on Congress’s reference to section 102 of Title V.129 The D.C. Circuit interpreted the decision by Congress to reference a title that was codified
to organize civilian officers and employees as an indication that

Id.
See id. (“The place to make new legislation, or address unwanted consequences of
old legislation, lies in Congress.”).
126See id. (“As judges we possess no special expertise or authority to declare for ourselves what a self-governing people should consider just or wise.”).
127 See id. at 1737 (“When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law,
and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
128 Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
129 Id. at 768.
124
125
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“Congress was referring to civilian employees within the military departments by referencing Title [V].”130 Based on this assumption of
purpose, the D.C. Circuit then reasoned incorrectly that Congress
must have intended for courts to transpose Title V’s definition of
“employee” found in section 2105, even though Title VII’s sole reference to Title V is expressly limited to the definition of military departments found in section 102.131
The Modly court’s rationale in replacing Title VII’s employee definition with Title V’s is wholly at odds with Bostock because it is predicated on judicial surmise and speculation.132 The plain language of
Title VII indicates that Title V’s role in interpreting Title VII is limited
solely to providing a definition of military departments.133
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Modly is further at odds with Bostock by giving weight to the use of post enactment legislative history.134 In particular the court emphasized that “Congress has
amended various parts of Title VII over the years, including the specific provision at issue here, . . . but has never sought to override our
sister circuits’ determination that uniformed members of the armed
forces are not included under Title VII.”135 Bostock cautions, however,

Id. at 769.
See id. (“Second, and more importantly, in the same legislation that defined ‘military departments’ under section 102 of Title 5, the Congress also defined ‘employees’ under that title.”); id. at 769–70 (concluding that when Congress referenced section 102 of
Title V, “it extended Title VII protections only to federal civilian employees within the
military departments, not members of the armed forces that it considered to be outside the
definition of employees in the federal civil service”).
132 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (“If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract
from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our imaginations, we
would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives.”).
133 Id. at 1737 (“When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and
all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
134 See Modly, 949 F.3d at 773 (“Although we recognize the limited value of congressional acquiescence as an interpretive tool, we nevertheless find the Congress’s inaction
for over forty years particularly significant for a couple of reasons.”).
135 Id.
130
131
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that congressional action or inaction has no place in statutory interpretation.136
Bostock Explicitly Warns Judges Against Reconfiguring the Plain
Language of a Statute Based on Extratextual Considerations and
Judicial Surmise
In Johnson v. Alexander,137 the Eighth Circuit focused on the
unique nature of military employment as compared to civilian employment in ultimately rejecting the proposition that Title VII applies
to the uniformed military.138 Because of the unique nature of military
employment, the Johnson court concluded that “if Congress had intended for the statute to apply to the uniformed personnel of the various armed services it would have said so in unmistakable terms.”139
In so holding, the Johnson court adopted a position that is now at
odds with the admonition announced thirty years later in Bostock
against the use of a default standard in interpreting Title VII narrowly despite the absence of a congressional exception.140 Bostock requires that where no express statutory exception exists, a court must
apply Title VII broadly to cast a wider net of protection for groups
and individuals.141 As Bostock cautions, it is the role of the judiciary
to interpret the plain meaning of the statute as currently written.142 It

136 See Bostock, 174 S. Ct. at 1747 (“There’s no authoritative evidence explaining why
later Congresses adopted other laws referencing sexual orientation but didn’t amend this
one.”).
137 Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978).
138 See id. at 1223–24 (“While military service possesses some of the characteristics of
ordinary civilian employment, it differs materially from such employment in a number of
respects that immediately spring to mind, and the peculiar status of uniformed personnel
of our armed forces has frequently been recognized by the courts.”).
139 Id. at 1224.
140 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747 (“[W]hen Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule. And that is exactly how this Court has
always approached Title VII.”).
141 Id.
142 See id. at 1739 (“No doubt, Congress could have taken a more parsimonious approach. As it has in other statutes, it could have added ‘solely’ to indicate that ‘actions
taken “because of” the confluence’ of multiple factors do not violate the law . . . . Or it
could have written ‘primarily because of” to indicate that the prohibited factor had to be
the main cause of the defendant’s challenged employment decisions . . . . But none of this
is the law we have.”).
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is not the role of the judiciary to postulate assumptions or exceptions
that are limited only by an individual judges imagination as to the
alternative ways Congress could have written the law, and to interpret the law based on such forays into speculation.143 Moreover, the
dictionary definitions of “employee” at the time of Title VII’s enactment broadly define the employer-employee relationship as one in
which services and labor are exchanged for money.144 The uniformed
military is employed by the federal government.145 Thus excluding
the military from Title VII, as the Johnson court did, ignores the plain
meaning of the law.146 By ignoring the plain meaning of the law, a
must then court supply its own subjective reasoning to justify why
the uniformed military should be excluded.147 Similar to the Eighth
Circuit in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez v. Department of
Army148 fashioned its own judicial exclusion for why the uniformed
military should be excluded from Title VII.
The Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez held that Title VII does not apply
to the uniformed military because they are not members of the “military departments” as defined in section 102 of Title V.149 In reaching
this decision, the Gonzalez court placed great emphasis on the fact
that Congress separately defined “military departments” and
“armed forces” in Title V and Title X to conclude that Congress

Id. at 1738.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 27. (quoting Employee, WEBSTER’S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975) (“one employed by another usually for wages or salary and in a position below the executive level”); Employee, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953) (“[o]ne employed by another; one who works
for wages or salary in the service of an employer”); Employ, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1975) (“to use or engage the services of”); Employ, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953) (“To make use of the services of; to give employment to; to entrust with some duty or behest; as, to employ an envoy”)).
145 Id.
146 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“If judges could add to,
remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources
and our imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process
reserved for the people’s representatives.”).
147 Id.
148 Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983).
149 See id. at 928 (concluding that Title VII can be “fairly understood to include only
civilian employees of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and not both civilian employees and
enlisted personnel”).
143
144
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intended to exclude uniformed members of the armed forces from
Title VII.150
The Gonzalez court rationale proceeds from the observation that
section 102 of Title V of the United States Code, which Title VII references, defines “military departments” as the Department of the
Army, Navy, and the Air Force.151 It then notes that Title X, which
codifies Congress’s structuring of the military, similarly defines
“military departments” as the Department of the Army, Navy, and
the Air Force.152 The argument then proceeds to place great weight
on the fact that Title V and Title X, separate from “military departments,” define “armed forces” as the “Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Crops, and Coast Guard.”153 The appellate courts that ascribe to
this rationale have thus precluded uniformed military members
from Title VII’s coverage based on the separate definitions for “military departments” and “armed forces” found within these sections
based on their conclusion that “[t]he two differing definitions show
that Congress intended a distinction between ‘military departments’
and ‘armed forces,’ the former consisting of civilian employees, the
latter of uniformed personnel.”154 Significantly, the rationale offered
by the Gonzalez court has been directly rejected by the D.C. Circuit
and Eighth Circuit which both held that the plain language of the
statute compels a reading that the “military departments” referenced
in Title V includes both civilian and uniformed employees.155
As the D.C. Circuit explained in Jackson v. Modly156 a “quick review of the Congress’s structuring of the military in Title 10 shows

150 See id. (“The two differing definitions show that Congress intended a distinction
between ‘military departments’ and ‘armed forces,’ the former consisting of civilian employees, the latter of uniformed military personnel.”).
151 5 U.S.C. § 102.
152 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(8).
153 5 U.S.C. § 2102(2); 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4).
154 Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928.
155 See Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding that the term “military departments” referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 contains “both civilian employees and the
armed forces”); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978) (“The great ‘military departments’ . . . referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 include not only uniformed personnel
of various ranks and grades but also of thousands of men and women employed in civilian
capacities.” (citation omitted)).
156 949 F.3d 763.
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that uniformed members of the armed forces are within the umbrella
of the military departments.”157 The court cited to several Title X provisions which explicitly include the uniformed military members
that comprise the “armed forces” as service persons contained within
the greater “military departments.”158 Therefore, the Modly court
held that based on the express meaning of “military departments”
and “armed forces” contained within the relevant statutes, the plain
meaning of the text provided a clear directive that the “military departments contain both civilian employees and the armed forces.”159
As the D.C. Circuit noted, the appellate courts that drew this distinction, like the Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez, created a judicially crafted
exception based on judicial speculation rather than following the
plain language of the relevant statutes.160
Furthermore, the Gonzalez court utilized the same approach as
the Johnson court by journeying into the realm of judicial surmise for
support to interpret Title VII narrowly in the absence of an explicit
congressional exclusion of the uniformed military.161 Bostock requires
that where no express exception exists, a court must apply Title VII
to broadly maximize its reach and protections for groups and individuals.162
Bostock Commands the Plain Language of Title VII be Applied
Broadly to Protect the Greatest Number of Individuals and Groups
in the Absence of a Congressionally Created Exception
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the
agency charged with enforcing Title VII, promulgated a rule that set
forth the general prohibition against discrimination, including in the

Id. at 768.
See id. (citing to several Title X provision which “make clear that the term ‘armed
forces’ refers to the uniformed fighting forces within the three ‘military departments”).
159 Id. at 769.
160 See id. (concluding that the express meaning of military departments as defined in
the relevant statutes, “on its own, contrary to what other courts have concluded, in fact
supports an interpretation that Title VII covers uniformed members of the armed forces”).
161 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020) (“[W]hen Congress
chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule. And
that is exactly how this Court has always approached Title VII.”).
162 Id.
157
158
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military departments, before stating that the regulation “does not apply to . . . [u]niformed members of the military departments.”163 The
Supreme Court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown164 held that a substantive
rule, or “legislative-type rule,” is one “’affecting individual rights
and obligations’ affecting individual rights and obligations’ . . . This
characteristic is an important touchstone for distinguishing those
rules that may be ‘binding’ or have the ‘force of law.’”165 A substantive or legislative type rule, issued by an agency charged with enforcing a statute, is accorded the force of law, and is thereby binding
upon the courts and the public.166
The EEOC’s Regulation is Not Binding Because it was Not Promulgated Pursuant to an Explicit Delegation of Authority by Congress
An agency can only issue a substantive or legislative rule if “Congress has delegated legislative power to the agency and if the agency
intended to exercise that power in promulgating the rule.”167 Here,
Congress only delegated the authority to issue “suitable procedural
regulations,” to carry out the provisions of Title VII to the EEOC.168
Thus, in limiting the EEOC’s authority to procedural regulations,

29 C.F.R. § 1614.104(d)(1) (2009).
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
165 Id. at 302 (citation omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974)); see
General Motors Corp v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.3d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[I]f by its action
the agency intends to create new law, rights or duties, the rule is properly considered to
be a legislative rule.”).
166 See Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920) (finding that a legislative “has the force and effect of law if it be not in conflict with express statutory provision[s]”); KENNETH DAVIS & RICHARD PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 233 (3d ed.
1994) (“[The legislative rule] binds members of the public, the agency, and even the court,
in the sense that courts must affirm a legislative rule as long as it represents a valid exercise
of agency authority.”).
167 Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1993); see Theodore W. Wern, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights
Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second-Class Agency, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1544
(1999) (stating that an agency can only promulgate a legislative rule pursuant to a “congressional grant of authority (either explicit[ly] or implicit[ly])”).
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12.
163
164
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Congress explicitly chose not to delegate to the EEOC the authority
to promulgate substantive rules with the force of law.169
The EEOC’s website prominently displays Congress’s decision
to only give it procedural, and not substantive, rulemaking authority.170 The EEOC’s website expressly states that [u]nder Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, [the] EEOC’s authority to issue legislative regulations is limited to procedural, record keeping, and reporting matters. Regulations issued by [the] EEOC without explicit authority
from Congress, [are] called ‘interpretive regulations,’ and do not create any new legal rights or obligations[] and are followed by courts
only to the extent that they find EEOC’s positions to be persuasive.”171
The fact that the Administrative Procedure Act does not require
the EEOC to utilize notice-and-comment procedures when issuing
regulations pursuant to Title VII lends further support to the argument that the EEOC’s regulation is an interpretive rule.172 The Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen Congress authorizes an agency to
proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking,” under the Administrative Procedures Act, that relatively formal administrative
“procedure, is a ‘very good indicator’ that Congress intended the
regulation to carry the force of law.”173 Here, however, Congress explicitly exempted the EEOC from engaging in notice-and-comment
procedures, further demonstrating that Congress did not delegate to

169 See Wern, supra note 167, at 1544 (“For example, under the Civil Rights Act, Congress did not grant the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules with the force of law, but
such a grant is clear under the ADA.”).
170 See What You Should Know: EEOC Regulations, Subregulatory Guidelines and Other
Resource
Documents,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/what-you-should-know-eeoc-regulations-subregulatory-guidance-and-other-resource (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
171 Id.
172 See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1941 n.22 (2006) (“Title VII does not require the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC’) EEOC to use notice-and-comment procedures in issuing its regulations.”).
173 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016) (quoting United
States v. Mead Corp., 535 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001)).
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the EEOC the authority to issue substantive regulations which carry
the force of law.174
In Hodge v. Dalton175 and Brown v. United States,176 the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits respectively, found that the aforementioned EEOC regulation was a substantive rule.177 Moreover, both courts both the
EEOC promulgated the substantive rule pursuant to an explicit delegation of authority by Congress, and was therefore binding upon
the courts because it carried the force of law.178 Congress, however,
did not delegate to the EEOC the authority to issue legislative or substantive regulations pursuant to Title VII.179 Thus, the Hodge and
Brown courts erred in concluding that they were bound to follow the
EEOC regulation because it was made pursuant to a congressional
grant of authority.180
Although the EEOC regulation is substantive in nature because
it affects legal rights and obligations, because it was not made

174 See Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 n.7 (2002) (“Title VII does not
require the EEOC to utilize notice-and-comment procedures.”).
175 Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F. 3d 705 (9th Cir. 1997).
176 Brown v. U.S., 227 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2000).
177 See Hodge, 107 F.3d at 708 (finding that 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103 affected “‘individual
rights and obligations’ and thus constitutes a substantive rule”); Brown, 227 F.3d at 298
(“Furthermore, this regulation constitutes a substantive rule based on the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, because it ‘affects individual rights and obligations.’”(citation omitted)).
178 See Hodge, 107 F.3d at 707 (concluding that “Congress expressly granted the EEOC
rulemaking authority to implement and enforce Title VII” and “[p]ursuant to this grant of
authority, the EEOC promulgated regulations defining the various forms of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII and establishing the procedure for enforcement”); Brown, 227 F.3d
at 298 (“Consequently, because it is a substantive rule and the EEOC issued the regulation
under the auspices of a congressional grant of power, it should be accorded the ‘force and
effect of law.’”).
179 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (“The Commission shall have authority from time to time
to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of
this subchapter.”); Edelman, 535 U.S. at 113 (noting that the EEOC would exceed the power
vested in it by Congress if it promulgated “a substantive issue over which the EEOC has
no rulemaking power”).
180 See Hodge, 107 F.3d at 707 (concluding that “Congress expressly granted the EEOC
rulemaking authority to implement and enforce Title VII. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000-16(b)”
and “[P]ursuant to this grant of authority, the EEOC promulgated regulations defining the
various forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VII and establishing the procedure for
enforcement”); Brown, 227 F.3d at 298 (“Consequently, because it is a substantive rule and
the EEOC issued the regulation under the auspices of a congressional grant of power, it
should be accorded the ‘force and effect of law.’”).
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pursuant to a congressional grant of authority it can only be categorized as a mere interpretive guideline stating the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII.181 Such an interpretation, however, is not binding
upon the courts.182 Significantly, even the United States government
did not dispute the classification of the EEOC regulation as an interpretive rule, conceding in its brief to the D.C. Circuit in Jackson v.
Modly that the regulation is an interpretive rule.183 As the government explained in its brief, because the regulation substantively
strips a class of its ability to seek a remedy for a harm committed
against it, it amounts “to an interpretive rule because it advises the
public about the EEOC’s understanding of the scope of the statute it
administers.”184 In sum, the EEOC regulation can only be categorized
as an interpretative rule that is not binding upon a court.
Under Skidmore Deference, the EEOC’s Interpretative Guideline
is Unpersuasive Because it Undermines the Broad Remedial Purpose of Title VII in Violation of Bostock
The Supreme Court in General Electric Co v. Gilbert185 concluded
that because Congress “did not confer upon the EEOC [the] authority
to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to [Title VII],” courts
“may accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative
regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of
law.”186

181 See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 170 (“Regulations issued
by EEOC without explicit authority from Congress, called ‘interpretive regulations,’ do
not create any new legal rights or obligations, and are followed by courts only to the extent
they find EEOC’s positions to be persuasive.”).
182 Id.
183 See Brief for Appellee at 32, Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No.
18-5180), 2019 WL 2647445, at *32 (writing that the EEOC regulation is exempt from notice
and comment procedures partly because it is “an interpretive rule” explaining “whom the
EEOC interprets to be outside the coverage of Title VII”).
184 See id. (“For our purposes, it suffices to say that the critical feature of interpretive
rules is that they are ‘issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction
of the statutes and rules which it administers.’” (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135
S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (citation omitted))).
185 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
186 Id. at 141.
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A court reviewing an interpretive rule promulgated by an
agency in the absence of a congressional grant of authority, such as
the EEOC interpretive guideline mentioned in Gilbert, is only required to be accorded what is known as Skidmore deference.187
Under the Skidmore deference doctrine, a court may defer to an
agency interpretation only if it finds an agency’s interpretation is
persuasive depending on factors such as, “the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which gave it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”188 Moreover, an
agency rule can be struck down if a court finds the non-binding
agency “suffers from some procedural infirmity, or is not consistent
with what the court believes is Congress’s intent, then the court may
disregard the agency interpretation and substitute its own views as
to what the statute means.”189 Thus, rather than being bound to follow the EEOC’s interpretive guideline, the Hodge and Brown courts
were only obligated to follow it to the extent the guideline was persuasive.190
Applying Skidmore deference to the EEOC interpretative guideline, the exclusion of the uniformed military is not persuasive based
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock.191 Foremost, the Supreme
Court recognized the broad remedial purpose of Title VII by rejecting
the idea that there is such a thing as a “’cannon of donut holes,’ in
which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls
within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception.”192
Moreover, the Supreme Court found that applying the express terms
of Title VII to situations “beyond the principal evil” that the statute
was designed to prohibit only served to reaffirm that Congress,
through its inclusion of broad language, intended for the statute to

187 See United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (finding that an agency is
accorded Skidmore deference when Congress did not delegate “authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
188 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1940).
189 Wern, supra note 167, at 1541.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020).
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serve a broad remedial purpose.193 Thus, when applying the ordinary
public meaning of the express terms of a statute, any “unexpected
applications of broad language reflect only Congress’s ‘presumed
point [to] produce general coverage — not to leave room for courts
to recognize ad hoc exceptions.”194
The EEOC interpretive guideline is directly at odds with Bostock’s
interpretation of Title VII because it creates an exception where the
plain language clearly evinces congressional purpose to broadly
frame Title VII’s coverage.195 As the Supreme Court stated in Bostock,
when “Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad
rule, courts apply the broad rule.”196 Thus, the EEOC interpretation
is unpersuasive under Skidmore deference because it created an exception in the absence of a congressional delegation of power, and
without Congress itself legislating an exception.197
Bostock Rejects Judicially Crafted Exceptions Like the Feres Doctrine That Ignore the Plain Language of a Statute from Which the
Doctrine is Derived
The final rationale used by the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit
to preclude uniformed military members from bringing a Title VII
claim is based upon the Feres doctrine.198 The Feres doctrine is concerned with maintaining the good order and discipline in the military by avoiding the supposed “effects of the maintenance of lawsuits on military discipline.”199 The Feres doctrine provides that

193 See id. at 1749 (“But ‘the fact that [a statute] has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress’ does not demonstrate ambiguity; instead, it simply
‘demonstrates [the] breath’ of a legislative command.” (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985))).
194 Id. (quoting A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 101 (2012)).
195 See id. at 1747 (concluding that when “Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule”).
196 Id.
197 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1940).
198 Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997); Roper v. Dep’t of the Army, 832
F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987).
199 Cooper T. Fyfe, The Detrimental Pitfall of the FTCA: Overturning Feres & Endorsing
the Sergeant First Class Richard Stayskal Military Medical Accountability Act of 2019, 52 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 877, 887 (2020).
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claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act are unavailable
“for injuries to [military] servicemen where the injuries arise out of
or are in the course of activity incident to service.”200 The Feres doctrine is rooted in the idea that the military “constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian”201 in which “the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce
be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and
duty.”202 Therefore, in order for the military to successfully operate,
the military demands “instinctive obedience, unity, commitment,
and esprit de corps.”203
The rationale underlying the Feres doctrine is to prevent civilian
adjudicatory authority from interfering with military decisions that
would detrimentally impact the “good order and discipline” within
the United States uniformed military.204 The argument against recognizing the right of uniformed military members to bring a Title VII
claim under the Feres doctrine is that allowing such a claim would
undermine and destroy good order and discipline within the military.
In Hodge v. Dalton,205 the Ninth Circuit extended the application
of the Feres doctrine to a Title VII claim.206 The Hodge court justified
this extension by asserting that the Feres doctrine is implicated whenever a legal action “would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control of

See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.
83, 94 (1953)).
202 Id. (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
203 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
204 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 (1987)
Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by service members
against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are
barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the “type[s] of claims
that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive
military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.” (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
205 Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1997).
206 See id. at 710 (“The doctrine of intramilitary immunity, or ‘the Feres Doctrine’ lends
further support to the conclusion that Hodge is not covered by [Title VII].”).
200
201
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members of the armed forces of the United States.”207 Thus, the Hodge
court found that as a matter of policy it is not for a civilian court to
hear a Title VII claim because entertaining such a claim would
threaten the good order and discipline of a smooth functioning military.208 Reasoning as it did, the Hodge court held that a Title VII claim
could not be maintained because of the Feres doctrine.209
The Feres Doctrine Erodes Rather Then Promotes Good Order
and Discipline Within the United States Armed Forces
Significantly, the Feres doctrine has been widely criticized as an
outdated, judicially created doctrine.210 Critics of the Feres doctrine
include members of the Supreme Court. For example, the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing in dissent, stated that the “Feres was wrongly
decided and heartily deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.”211 Justice Clarence Thomas similarly condemned the Feres doctrine writing that, “[t]here is no support for
[Feres’s] conclusion in the text of the statute, and it has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen of any remedy when they

207 McGowan v. Scoggins, 890 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)).
208 See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1985) (concluding that it is not the
prerogative of a civilian court to “second-guess military decisions” regarding “the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman”).
209 Hodge, 107 F.3d at 710; see Westergard, supra note 6, at 249 (writing that the judiciary’s use of the Feres doctrine to preclude claims brought by the uniformed military to
supposedly protect uniform and discipline within the military is merely “policy dressed
up as legal analysis”).
210 See Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3rd Cir. 1973) (“If the matter were
open to us we would be receptive to appellants’ argument that Feres should be reconsidered, and perhaps restricted to injuries occurring in the course of service.”); Costo v.
United States, 248 F.3d 863, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2001) (criticizing the Feres doctrine and its
application).
211 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re “Agent Orange”
Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The late Justice Ginsburg has
similarly voiced her discontent with the lower court’s application of the Feres doctrine,
writing that “[w]hile lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Feres,
they are hardly obliged to extend the limitation.” Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215,
233 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

48

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23.1

are injured by the negligence of the Government or its employees.”212
Such criticism portends that use of the Feres doctrine to bar the uniformed military from raising a Title VII claim is not likely to survive
future judicial scrutiny.213 Moreover, the argument that recourse to a
Title VII claim would disrupt order and discipline in the military ignores the negative impact that discrimination currently has on unit
cohesion and morale within the military.214 Discriminatory conduct,
such as sexual harassment, has a direct impact on uniformed military
members and their ability to carry out essential functions.215 Permitting such conduct directly implicates the effectiveness and success of
the military.216 In a 1997 study, one researcher calculated the cost attributed to the military lacking an adequate legal process to resolve
sexual harassment claims in the United States Army at “$250 million
a year in lost productivity, personnel replacement costs, transfers[,]
and absenteeism.”217 In a 2011 report, the DoD acknowledged that
the “costs and consequences of [sexual assault] for mission accomplishment are unbearable.”218 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated the consequences of not reforming the current military justice
system in the context of sexual assault and harassment within the
United States armed forces, stating,
Sexual harassment is always demeaning and often permanently scars the victim. Furthermore, it renders the workplace less productive and stifles the initiative and creative

212 Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
213 See Purcell v. United States, 656 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The Feres doctrine . . . is certainly not without controversy . . . and has also been widely criticized.” (citation omitted)).
214 See Critchlow, supra note 73 at 873–74 (stating that “denying service members who
are suffering from sexual harassment a means of recourse negatively impacts” order and
discipline in the military by causing a breakdown in unit cohesion).
215 See Richard J. Harris et al., Sexual Harassment in the Military: Individual Experiences,
Demographics, and Organizational Context, 44 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 25, 26 (2017) (stating
that sexual harassment in the military has been found to negatively impact a uniformed
servicemember by causing “career interruptions, lowered productivity, . . . and loss of
commitment to work and employer”).
216 Id.
217 Nathan Seppa, Sexual Harassment in the Military Lingers On, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N
MONITOR, May 1997, at 40–41.
218 2012 SAPRO REPORT, supra note 27, at 97.
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capacity of the organization. When the organizations involved are the Armed Forces of the United States, the victim,
in addition to the suffering experienced by all such victims,
is deprived of the very special satisfaction that military service to the Country should bring. Tolerance of such behavior
also results in a warping of military discipline, a lack of military readiness, and a weaking of national security.219
The Feres doctrine is predicated on the theory that order and discipline in the military is preserved by barring uniformed military
members from bringing legal claims that are incidental to a member’s service.220 This doctrine ignores the simple reality that because
the military has inadequate channels for relief to stop and deter discriminatory conduct, the Feres doctrine empowers discord and
erodes the trust between soldiers in the military by tacitly tolerating
such conduct.221 As the former Secretary of the Army, Togo West,
and the former Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, stated
before Congress, such distrust causes a lack of teamwork such that
when soldiers actually engage in combat missions, it “can often lead
to the failure of the mission, or even injury or death.”222 In United
States v. Johnson,223 for example, a military widow was barred from
suing a civilian tortfeasor responsible for her husband’s death.224 In
his dissent, Justice Scalia forcefully illustrated how the Feres doctrine
undermines, rather than preserves good order and discipline in the
military, when he stated, “[a]fter all, the morale of Lieutenant Commander Johnson’s comrades in arms will not likely be boosted by

Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 778 (1999).
See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1985) (concluding that it is not the
prerogative of a civilian court to “second-guess military decisions” regarding “the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman”).
221 See Dana Michael Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat
Sexual Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 153 (2007) (“When sexual
harassment exists, male and female soldiers are less likely to interact normally and work
as members of a team.”).
222 There’s a Problem, and We Mean to Fix It, Prepared Remarks to the Senate Armed Servs.
Comm., 105th Cong. 10 (1997) (statement of Togo D. West, Jr. Sec’y of the Army and Gen.
Dennis J. Reimer, U.S., Army Chief of Staff).
223 United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
224 Id. at 683.
219
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news that his widow and children will receive only a fraction of the
amount they might have recovered had he been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time of his death.”225 The continued application
of the Feres doctrine serves to only damage military morale by preventing uniformed military members from obtaining adequate judicial relief.226
The Continued Existence of the Feres Doctrine is Irreconcilable
with the Supreme Court’s Command in Bostock to Follow the
Plain Meaning of a Statute
The Feres doctrine provides that the Federal Tort Claims Act is
unavailable “for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”227 The Supreme
Court created the Feres doctrine by interpreting a section of the Federal Tort Claims Act which stated that the United States would not
waive its sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”228 Congress in passing the Federal Tort Claims Act
did not preclude lawsuits by service members during peace time, but
inserted an express exception during a time of war.229 Interpreting
the plain meaning of the express terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act
in accordance with Bostock the statute bars only suits by uniformed
members of the military during a war.230 Yet the Supreme Court, in
crafting the Feres doctrine, ignored the plain language of the statute
by creating a rule that bars all claims brought by the uniformed

Id. at 700.
Id.
227 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
228 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
229 Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003) (observing
that rather than precluding all lawsuits by service members in passing the Federal Tort
Claims Act, Congress instead chose to “limit preclusion to combat injuries”).
230 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“This Court normally
interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of
its enactment.”); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“We have
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statue what it
means in a statue what is says there.”).
225
226

2021]

PROTECTING OUR PROTECTORS

51

military, including claims that concern conduct that is merely incidental to service, and does not involve combat activities during
war.231 The Sixth Circuit in Major v. United States232 articulated that
the Feres doctrine has greatly deviated from the plain language of the
Federal Tort Claims Act because it encompasses,
at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that
are even remotely related to the individual’s status as a
member of the military, without regard to the location of the
event, the status (military or civilian) of the tortfeasor, or any
nexus between the injury-producing event and the essential
defense/combat purpose of the military activity from which
it arose.233
Thus, the Feres doctrine, in addition to other infirmities, also runs
afoul of the rationale articulated by the majority in Bostock because it
is a product of judicial surmise that extends far beyond what is stated
expressly in the statute.234 As previously mentioned, the Feres doctrine has been widely criticized as an outdated judicial doctrine precisely because it extends beyond the express terms of the statute
based on judicial conjecture.235

231 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (“If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract
from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our imaginations, we
would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives.”); Turley, supra note 229, at 4 (“Despite language in the Federal Tort Claims
Act that only exempts combat-related injuries from liability, the Supreme Court engaged
in what can be viewed as a quintessential exercise of judicial activism—crafting an immunity system to achieve values and objectives of its own design.”).
232 Major v. United States, 835 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1987).
233 Id. at 644-45.
234 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737 (stating that “[w]hen the express terms of a statute
give us [an] answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest [o]nly
the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit”); Costo v. United
States, 248 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (stating forcefully that
“[judges] should never overrule the plain language of Congress unless there is a constitutional violation” and that doing so “runs against our basic separation of power powers
principles” because it constitutes a usurpation by the judiciary of Congress’s essential
function as the legislator).
235 See Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“There is no support for [Feres’s] conclusion in the text of the statute, and it
has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen of any remedy when they are
injured by the negligence of the Government or its employees.”); United States v. Johnson,
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Furthermore, Bostock makes clear, that naked policy appeals are
“an invitation no court should ever take up.”236 Yet the Feres doctrine
is inextricably linked with policy concerns that uniformed military
members should be barred from bringing certain claims in civilian
courts because it would undermine order and discipline in the military.237 The Feres doctrine cannot be reconciled with the Bostock majority holding that the plain language of Title VII must govern, regardless of any secondary policy implications that a court thinks may
result.238 The majority in Bostock articulated that its role is to interpret
the plain text of the statutes that come before it, while it is the role of
Congress to consider the policy implications of its actions as embodied in legislation.239 Thus, there is no reason why a “judge-made doctrine like Feres should be viewed as trumping a federal statue like
Title VII.”240

481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Feres was wrongly decided and heartily
deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.” (quoting In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)); Lombard v.
United States 690 F.2d 215, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Feres,
they are hardly obliged to extend the limitation.”).
236 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753; see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(stating that the judiciary must not assume the role of a “superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect
fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines”).
237 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690 (“‘Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by
service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are
barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the “type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military
discipline and effectiveness.”’” (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
238 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (explaining that the judiciary must always apply the
plain meaning of the express terms of a statute regardless of the policy implications).
239 See id.
The place to make new legislation, or address unwanted consequences of old legislation, lies in Congress. When it comes to statutory
interpretation, our role is limited to applying the law’s demands as
faithfully as we can in the cases that come before us. As judges we
possess no special expertise or authority to declare for ourselves what
a self-governing people should consider just or wise.
240 Turley, supra note 229, at 84 n.565; see id. (“[I]t remains a mystery why Title VII
claims should be barred under Feres, even in cases involving service members.”); Costo,
248 F.3d at 869–70 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (writing that the Feres doctrine “represents
judicial legislation, effectively negating the Congressional limitations that the excluded
claims must arise from ‘combatant activities . . . during time of war’”).
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As Chief Justice Earl Warren once observed, “citizens in uniform
may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed
their civilian clothes.”241 It is ironic that military members are judicially excluded from rights that they protect for everyone.242 The
plain text of Title VII provides the uniformed military with a right
that has remained dormant. As will be discussed in Part VII, the majority’s analysis in Bostock provides the framework for vindicating
uniformed military member’s right to the statutory protections of Title VII.243
WHY TITLE VII SHOULD INCLUDE THE UNIFORMED MILITARY
FOLLOWING BOSTOCK
The analysis employed by Bostock requires that the terms of Title
VII be accorded the ordinary meaning that attached to this statutory
provision at the time of its enactment.244 Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in [S]ection 102 of title [V] . . . shall be
made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”245 Title V Section 102 in turn states “[t]he military
departments are: The Department of the Army[;] The Department of
the Navy[;] The Department of the Air Force.”246 It is also significant
that Title VII has its own definition of “employee” which it generally
defines as “an individual employed by an employer.”247 Title V Section 102, the sole section explicitly referenced in Title V by Title VII,

Warren, supra note 63, at 188.
See Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1038–39 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing the Supreme
Court’s increasingly broad application of the Feres doctrine as “exceedingly willful” and
representative of the Supreme Court’s “willingness to ignore language, history, and the
process of incremental law making”); Costo, 248 F.3d at 870–71 (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
(“When considering the Feres doctrine, however, we are not dealing with a legislative action, but rather with a judicial re-writing of an unambiguous and constitutional statute.”).
243 See infra Part VII.
244 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737 (writing that the express terms of a statute must always be applied over extratextual considerations “[w]hen the express terms of a statute
give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another”).
245 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).
246 5 U.S.C. § 102.
247 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
241
242
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only contains the definition of “military departments.”248 Section 102
of Title V contains no definition of “employee,” nor does it even mention the word “employee” within the section.249 Indeed, to even find
how Title V defines an “employee,” one would have to leave Section
102 of Title V, the sole section of Title V referenced by Title VII, and
journey to Section 2105(a) of Title V, a section that was never mentioned by any express term in Title VII, nor indicated by the plain
language of Title VII to have any bearing on how a court should define an “employee” in interpreting Title VII.250 As Bostock makes
clear, judges “are not free to overlook plain statutory commands on
the strength of nothing more than suppositions about intentions or
guesswork about expectations.”251
In interpreting Title VII, the definition of “employee” found
within the statute is what must be applied based on what an ordinary
public meaning of “employee” was at the time Title VII was enacted.
The standard dictionary definitions of the word “employee” at the
time of Title VII’s enactment uniformly observe that an employee is
an individual who is compensated by an employer for the services
and duties he or she completes in the course of said employment.252
Thus, an ordinary reading of Title VII’s definition of employee compels the conclusion that the uniformed military should be covered
under the statute.253

248 See 5 U.S.C. § 102 (“The military departments are: [(1)] The Department of the
Army[; (2)] The Department of the Navy[; (3)] The Department of the Air Force.”).
249 Id.
250 See 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (defining “employee” as “an officer and an individual who
is — (1) appointed in the civil service” by one of the various persons listed under that
provision).
251 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
252 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 27 (quoting Employee, WEBSTER’S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975) (“one employed by another usually for wages or salary and in a position below the executive level”); Employee, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953) (“[o]ne employed by another; one who works
for wages or salary in the service of an employer”); Employ, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1975) (“to use or engage the services of”); Employ, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953) (“To make use of the services of; to give employment to; to entrust with some duty or behest; as, to employ an envoy”)).
253 See Westergard, supra note 6, at 237 (“Servicepersons are each individuals, they
receive money in exchange for their work, and the federal government is a covered employer.”).
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It is equally apparent that the plain language of Title V is relevant
only so far as it provides a definition of “military departments” for
applying Title VII. To use Title V for anything else would contravene
the standard set forth in Bostock because the judiciary would be supplanting the express terms of Title VII with language from statutes
never expressly mentioned by Title VII based on nothing more than
conjecture by the judiciary as to what Congress could or might have
possibly intended.254
Title VII’s express terms indicate that the statute covers uniformed military members who have an employment relationship
with the federal government by currently serving in one of the military departments set forth in section 102 of Title V.255 As in Bostock,
the plain language of Title VII in this instance requires inclusivity
because Congress chose not to explicitly exclude the uniformed military. 256
CONCLUSION
By not recognizing the right of uniformed military members’ to
bring a Title VII claim to remedy discrimination while serving in the
United States military, the federal government has failed to “protect
the employees of one of the largest federal government employers.”257 The decision to not recognize a Title VII recourse for uniformed military members perpetuates a “striking discontinuity in
the duty of our servicemembers to defend liberties and rights with
which they are only partially vested.”258 To adequately protect the
protectors of the United States, the Supreme Court, in accordance

254 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (“When the express terms of a statute give us on
answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written
word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”); id. (“If judges could add to,
remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources
and our imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process
reserved for the people’s representatives.”).
255 5 U.S.C. § 102.
256 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) (stating in dicta that the “relationship
of the Government to members of the military . . . is . . . that of employer to employee”).
257 Montrece McNeill Ransom, The Boy’s Club: How “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Creates a
Double-Bind for Military Women, 27 L. & PSYCH. REV. 161, 173 (2001).
258 Turley, supra note 64, at 133.
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with Bostock, should hold that the express terms of Title VII include
the uniformed military.
Significantly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bostock despite the United States courts of appeals unanimously concluding
that Title VII did not apply to sexual orientation.259 The present circumstances regarding the reach of Title VII with respect to the uniformed military are like those in Bostock. There is unanimity in the
United States courts of appeals which have considered the issue declining to extend the reach of Title VII to the uniformed military. But
in so doing, not only have the United States courts of appeals failed
to apply the express terms of Title VII, but their respective rationales
for failing to do so are in conflict. The Supreme Court’s intervention
is particularly warranted “when the lower court decisions are so inconsistent in theory as to leave the intent and meaning of [a] statute
in a state of confusion.”260
The United States uniformed military, perhaps more than any individual or group in this country, deserves the full protection afforded by Title VII.261 No explicit command results in military members being excluded from the protections of Title VII. Rather, this
result is a product of anachronistic notions and deference to an argument about the ability of the military to perform if it is forced to adhere to societal change and reforms. As with the racial integration of
the armed services, the service of women, and later the service of
women in combat positions, 262 and the treatment of LGBTQ service

259 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that until 2017, “every
single Court of Appeals to consider the question interpreted Title VII’s prohibition against
sex discrimination to mean discrimination on the basis of biological sex”).
260 STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.13 (11th ed. 2019) (citing
Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 550–51 (2005)).
261 See Scott A. Liljegren, Winning the War Against Sexual Harassment Battle by Battle:
Why the Military Justice Model Works – A Proposal for Federal and State Statutory Reform, 38
WASHBURN L.J. 175, 203 (1998) (noting that the uniformed military members “who stand
ready to fight for the preservation of the nation and its federal law are many times the
same individuals denied the protections of the law”).
262 See Westergard, supra note 6, at 218 (“Over the course of the military’s history,
discrimination has come in various shapes and sizes, from segregating African-American
troops, to prohibiting women from serving in combat roles, to the military's ‘Don't Ask,
Don't Tell’ policy, to the Trump administration's recent attempts to ban transgender servicepersons from the military.”).
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members,263 time has shown that reforms and societal changes do not
undermine the military’s readiness.

263 See Banner, supra note 75, at 785 (“For nearly twenty years, the military carried out
overtly discriminatory practices without sanction under the guise that purposeful discrimination against gay and lesbian personnel, and particularly lesbian personnel, promoted
unit cohesion and combat readiness.”).

